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The Case for Gay and
Lesbian Marriage
By Mielle Abbey-A Schwartz
Courts and legislatures grant a heterosexual
couple the legal right to marry. (Krause 37) Why has this
legal right not been extended to include gay and lesbian
couples? The legal definition of family has no doubt
broadened:
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, for example,
the Supreme Court granted constitutional pro-
tection beyond nuclear families to extended
families. Despite this social and legal evolution,
[however,] courts and legislatures continually
have refused to grant gay and lesbian couples
family status. (Harvard ed. 94)
Even the legal substitutes for marriage, common-law
marriage and marriage by contract or declaration, have
been denied to gay and lesbian couples, while available
under some jurisdictions to heterosexual couples. (94)
Is this prohibition of same-sex marriage consti-
tutionally justifiable? Are the proposed interests of states
in prohibiting same-sex marriage justifiable by the stan-
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dards of constitutional law? These two questions will
structure the course of the argument to follow in favor of
legitimizing gay and lesbian marriage.
The importance of extending the
marriage right to gay and lesbian
couples is unassailable.
The Advantages of Marriage
Before delving into both a legal justification for
same-sex marriage and a consideration of the opposed
interests forwarded by states, the question must first be
asked: Why is it important to extend the marriage right to
include gay and lesbian couples? Why is it important that
there be a legal declaration of married couple status?
There are two answers to the preceeding questions. First,
marriage is considered a central institution of American
society, one of serious symbolic meaning to the couple.
(95) It certainly cannot be peremptorily concluded that
same-sex couples have less interest in the symbolic
meaning of marriage than heterosexuals. Second, mar-
riage affords critical economic and legal advantages to a
couple. Married partners are entitled to tax, insurance,
and housing benefits, succession benefits upon death of a
spouse, and worker's compensation (which provides
benefits to dependents of covered employees), to name a
few. (95,102,108)
In terms of legal advantages, housing law serves
as a clear example. New York City's Rent and Eviction
Regulation 2204.6[d], for instance, holds that:
no occupant of housing accommodations shall
be evicted...where the occupant is either the
surviving spouse of the deceased tenant or some
other member of the deceased tenant's family
who has been living with the tenant. (104)
In 1988, a New York appellate court prohibited a gay
partner from remaining in an apartment of his deceased
lover pending further litigation. The court asserted that
the regulations did not protect homosexual partners in this
respect, since according to the state legislature, the part-
ners were not legal spouses; they were not legally rec-
ognized as a family. (104)
Hence, the importance of extending the marriage
right to gay and lesbian couples is unassailable. Denial of
this right is of serious concern and certainly merits in-
quiry. The first of the two questions posed earlier may
now be addressed: Is the prohibition of same-sex marriage
constitutionally justifiable? The following argument will
demonstrate that denial of the same-sex couple's right to
marry falls far outside the ambit of the Constitution. The
denial of this right does not merely border on the un-
constitutional; it wallows in the unconstitutional.
The Right to Privacy: Personal Choice and Intimate
Association
The right to marry freely derives from the con-
stitutional right to privacy. (96) To marrv freely implies
first not being forced to marry, and more importantly to
the issue at hand, retaining the freedom of personal choice
in terms of whom to marry.
As an implied constitutional principle, the right
to marry is understood only as part of the right to privacy
and not vice versa. As such, it is a substantive right of
individuals. Therefore, regulations of those who are
married as well as those who would marry are equally
suspect as impinging on the right to marry. (Mohr 130)
Although the right to privacy has no explicit
mention in the Constitution, the Supreme Court has often
found a penumbra of privacy in the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. For example, in the 1965
case of Griswold v. Connecticut (to be discussed in
greater detail shortly), Justice Douglas described the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments as containing references to
Denial of the same-sex couple's
right to marry...does not merely
border on the unconstitutional; it
wallows in the unconstitutional.
privacy:
The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination
Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of
privacy which government may not force him to
surrender to his detriment...The Fourth and
Fifth Amendments were described in Boyd v.
United States, 116 US 616 [1886], as protection
against all governmental invasions "of the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of
life." (Gunther 505)
Based upon Supreme Court precedent, a right to privacy
certainly exists.
It must now be asked whether or not the right to
marry whom we want to is inherent in the general right to
privacy. In Loving v. Virginia (1967), this right was
clearly articulated:
The Court firmly established marriage as a




[ue., of human beings]. (Harvard ed. 95)
Justice Warren handed down the decision in Loving v.
Virginia:
The case presents a constitutional question never
addressed by this Court: whether a statutory
scheme adopted by [Virginia] to prevent mar-
riages between persons solely on the basis of
racial classifications violates [the] 14th
Amendment...we conclude that these statutes
cannot stand. [The Virginia appellants, a black
woman and a white man, were married in the
District of Columbia, returned to Virginia, and
convicted of violating Virginia's ban on inter-
racial marriages.] (Gunther 626)
This case marked a step toward a recognition of freedom
of personal choice in marrying. Loving protected "inti-
mate adult unions from societal prejudice." (Harvard ed.
95)
The concept of personal choice in marriage,
however, was not explicitly articulated until Cleveland
Board of Education v. LaFleur (1974). (Harvard ed. 96)
In Loving, the decision was cast more in terms of racial
equality, while in Cleveland, the Court declared:
The states mistakenly suggest that
same-sex couples cannot reproduce
and that they are therefore unable
to give birth to or raise children.
it has long recognized that freedom o/personal
[emphasis mine] choice in matters of marriage
and family life is one of the liberties protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. (Harvard ed. 96)
Should not homosexuals thus be allowed to choose ho-
mosexual marriage partners, as heterosexuals are legally
allowed to choose heterosexual marriage partners? Courts
and legislatures, however, continue to presume that a
man-woman pairing is legally necessary for marriage,
even though the Supreme Court has affirmed marriage as
a personal choice. Typically, the requirement that mar-
riage be between members of the opposite sex has not
even been explicitly written into marriage statutes. The
statutes have only implied the dictionary definition (Krause
37) that marriage involves the union of "husband and
wife." (Webster's 869) Thus, the freedom of personal
choice has been clearly legitimized within the genera
right-to-privacy framework; choosing a partner in marriage
is a personal choice, a private choice.
Legal grounds for same-sex marriage can further
be justified in terms of intimate association, which falls
under the right-of-privacy framework as well. In Roberts
v. UnitedStates Jaycees (1984), the Court explained that:
the freedom of association extends to "certain
kinds of highly personal relationships" that
"act as critical buffers between the individual
and the power of the State."
Under this theory, the state simply has no authority to
pressure individuals into heterosexual relationships by
giving only those relationships the benefits and protections
of the law. (Harvard ed. 97) Marriage can assuredly be
considered a highly personal relationship.
Standards of Scrutiny
The second question posed earlier may now be
addressed: Is a state's interest in prohibiting same-sex
marriage justifiable? States have claimed that prohibiting
same-sex marriage encourages procreation, encourages
traditional values, and promotes societal and familial
stability. (99-100)
Before delving into the interests at hand, it is first
important to briefly discuss the manner in which state
interests are addressed within constitutional law. Since
marriage is considered a fundamental right underZablocki
v. Redhail(1978), "critical examination of the state interest
advanced [is] required [by constitutional law]." (Gunther
554) Judges must apply strict scrutiny in assessing state
interests since marriage is of fundamental importance. In
the Zablocki decision, Justice Marshall explained that
Griswold:
established that the right to marry is part of the
fundamental 'right of privacy' implicit in [the]
Due Process clause ['nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law']. (Gunther 554)
Any state interests restricting this right must therefore be
strictly scrutinized. A "fundamental" right triggers strict
scrutiny (554), as opposed to regular scrutiny. The state's
interests must not simply be rationally related to its goals;
they must be compellingly related.
Countering State Interests
The states mistakenly suggest that same-sex
couples cannot reproduce and that they are therefore
unable to give birth to or raise children. Before consider-
ing if this interest in procreation is rationally or compel-
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lingly related, one must first ask whether or not the
interest agrees with Supreme Court precedent.
Marriage and procreation have in fact been
State legislatures have helped to
create and perpetuate the supposed
social fact of heterosexuality.
separated from one another in Supreme Court precedent.
In Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) (503), the Court struck
down a Connecticut statute which prohibited the use of
contraceptives and held that married couples should be
allowed to use them. Just to note, the Court did extend this
right to unmarried couples in Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972).
(Gunther 514) Hence, the Court has historically supported
contraception within and without marriage. How, then,
can states possibly claim a necessary linkage of marriage
with procreation, when the two have historically been
separated? As Mohr writes, "...marriage is not morally or
legally contingent upon the ability to have children...."
(131)
Nevertheless, we can proceed to ask: Is the state
interest in encouraging procreation compelling?
The prohibition on same-sex marriage cannot
withstand any (emphasis mine) level of scrutiny
because states cannot articulate legitimate in-
terests that are [even] rationally related to the
restrictions they impose. {Harvard ed. 99)
Although, the fundamental status bestowed upon marriage
requires that the state's interest in restricting marriage be
compelling, this interest is not even rationally related to
the restriction imposed: gay and lesbian couples can have
children through surrogacy and artificial insemination.
Moreover, many heterosexual couples either cannot or
choose not to have children. In fact,
the prohibition on same-sex marriage may in
fact discourage procreation; some same-sex
couples may elect not to have children precisely
because their relationship is not sanctioned by
the state. (98-100)
States also claim that prohibiting same-sex
marriage encourages traditional values. This interest is:
nothing more than an appeal to eliminate di-
versity, an interest explicitly rejected by the
Supreme Court. As Justice Blackmun has noted:
[tjhe legitimacy of secular legislation
depends...on whether the State can advance
some justification beyond its conformity to re-
ligious doctrine. (100)
Lastly, states claim that prohibiting same-sex
marriage encourages societal and familial stability. It
simply cannot be assumed, however, that gay men and
lesbians cannot have relationships as committed and
long-lasting as heterosexuals might.
The level of commitment in same-sex relation-
ships may in fact be higher than that in het-
erosexual relationships, given the psychological,
social, and legal obstacles that gay couples must
overcome in order to stay together. (100)
Moreover, who is to say that gay and lesbian couples
cannot create stable, safe, healthy environments for their
children?
Enforcing Heterosexuality
Why, then, do states dare to advance interests as
unreasonable as those discussed above? Feminist writer
Adrienne Rich argues that society has deemed hetero-
sexuality compulsory. Society has deemed heterosexual-
ity a social fact, and, she suggests, has tried to teach its
constituents what is considered sexually "normal." (Rich
641) This standard of supposed sexual normalcy has been
inflicted upon lesbians, for example, through overt vio-
As long as one member of a couple
preceived as male and the other is
perceived as female, the guise of
heterosexuality has been perpetu-
ated, the states are satisfied, and the
union of the partners is legitimized.
lence, threats and discrimination. (638-39) States seem to
feel that heterosexuality is indeed a social fact; thus, they
will impose any passable "interest" in order that the status
accorded to heterosexuality remain as such. State legis-
latures have helped to create and perpetuate the supposed
social fact of heterosexuality:
[a] nuance is added by litigation involving
'transsexuals' who have been held unable to
contractmarriage before a sex change operation
was performed...but whose marriage has been





If one partner of a gay couple, for example, undergoes
surgery to look like a woman, the state will allow the
couple to marry. According to the state's purported interest
of encouraging procreation, however, this decision is
irrational. The internal reproductive organs of the
transsexual, after all, are not altered in such an operation.
Procreation, as the state wrongly perceives it, would not
be enhanced, since both members of the couple would still
have male reproductive organs. The fact that states
contradict their own purported interest shows that the
courts and states are mainly interested in creating and
perpetuating a view of the world as heterosexual. As long
as one member of a couple is perceived as male and the
other is perceived as female, the guise of heterosexuality
has been perpetuated, the states are satisfied, and the
union of the partners is legitimized.
Classifying Sexual Orientation
The equal protection clause does not prevent the
states from classifying people into different groups when
the classification bears a relation to the ability to perform
or contribute to society. (Reed) People are classified on
the basis of intelligence and physical ability, for example.
It has been held that since these kinds of classifications
can indeed bear a relation to how a person may perform
or contribute to society, they are nonsuspect classifications.
(Frontiero 646) Some classifications, however, are
deemed suspect; that is, they bear little if no relation to the
Unwittingly or not, the courts imply
that sexual orientation bears some
relation to a person's ability to
perform or contribute to society.
ability to perform or contribute to society. Race is a
suspect classification, for example, while gender has been
treated as semi-suspect. (Gunther 642) A suspect clas-
sification must endure a stricter test than does a nonsuspect
classification. The former must not only bear a clear
relation to the state's purported objective; the interest
which calls upon such classification must also be com-
pellingly important, "with no less invasive means avail-
able" of satisfying the interest. (Thomas 71)
Sexual orientation, however, has not achieved
suspect classification status. (Harvard ed. 99) Thus, it
must only pass the rational basis test in order to be used as
a legitimate classification. Unwittingly or not, the courts
imply that sexual orientation bears some relation to a
person's ability to perform or contribute to society. Is this
really the case, however?
The courts must raise sexual orientation to suspect
status if prohibitions against same-sex marriage are to be
lifted. In the midst of prohibition, homosexual couples
have done what they can: "...gay men and lesbians have
sought to adopt their partners in order to leave them
property" under adult adoption plans. (116) Jurisdictions
are beginning to change the rules, although slowly.
Berkeley, California has...passed domestic
partner legislation giving gay couples the same
rights to city benefits asmarriedcouples... (Mohr
43)
Given that much homosexual conduct remains criminal
(Krause 38), however, it may take a while before homo-
sexual marriage is given serious consideration.
Conclusion
As has been shown, no clearly articulated con-
stitutional justification exists for prohibiting gay and
lesbian marriage. It must be assumed, then, that states and
courts have engaged and continue to engage in their own
moral prejudices, stigmatizing same-sex marriage as a
threat to the supposed sexual normalcy of heterosexual-
ity. Courts and legislatures should start accommodating
the Constitution rather than their legally unsubstantiated
values. Clearly, same-sex marriage is legally justifiable.
The sooner this legal right is recognized, the better.
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that the affirmative action program has had on the perfor-
mance of our government. Affirmative action was con-






In a large embassy outside the United States, a
vacancy has occurredfor supervisor of the typing
pool A civil service examination is administered
to all interested in qualifying to fill the vacancy.
The passing score on the exam is 70. The current
clerical and secretarial staff of the embassy is
overwhelmingly white, and of the fourteen su-
pervisors only one is black and one of Asian
descent. Of those eligible by reason of seniority
and superior performance in their current po-
sitions, the top score is earned by a white
woman—89. The next two scores are also
achieved by a white woman—one 86 and one 83.
A black woman earns a score of 79 and a
Chinese man earns a score of 69.
The position will go to ...
(A) The white woman who scored
highest, the 89
(B) Any one of the top three scorers,
whomever the personnel officer likes best
(C) The black woman who scored 79
(D) The Chinese man who scored 69.
(Floyd 68)
If one were to believe that the United States
government still rewarded hard work and achievement
with awards and promotion then common sense would
lead you to choose answer A. It is painfully obvious,
however, that this is no longer the case. The appropriate
answer is C. Yes, the black woman, although ranked
fourth by test score, would receive the position solely
because of her ethnicity or race.
As taken from a practice American Foreign
Service Officer Examination, one of the many US civil
service exams, this question exemplifies the influence
If the goal of [affirmative action's]
creators was to force-feed minorities
into the establishment with total
disregard to both level of qualifica-
tion and the efficiency of the bureau-
cracy then, in effect, they were suc-
cessful.
express purpose of advancing members of under-privi-
leged minorities toward leadership positions. Although
the rationale behind this program is quite noble, what
affect is it having on our nation as a whole? Prior to the
conception of this program, our nation operated, ideally,
with a policy of "advancement to the most deserving."
Unfortunately racism and the nepotism of "old boy net-
works" were impurities in the system that needed to be
eradicated. If the goal of the program's creators was to
force-feed minorities into the establishment with total
disregard to both level of qualification and the efficiency
of the bureaucracy then, in effect, they were successful.
But most would maintain that this was not the intention.
Another motivating factor behind the imple-
mentation of affirmative action was the relatively small
number of minority role models in high-level positions in
corporate America and the government. Without such
models, it was thought that there would be no motivation
for any member of a minority group to aspire to reach such
high plateaus in American society. The attempt to create
ethnic role models was also clear through the admissions
policies of many universities and colleges. But in actual-
ity, does this social advancement program achieve its
goals?
It has been found that racial dis-
crimination lias not been reduced
but rather shifted against the major-
ity rather than the minority.
It has been found that racial discrimination has
not been reduced but rather shifted against the majority
rather than the minority. Just as this sample problem
suggests, a person included under the 'white' or Cauca-
sian racial heading could be passed up for promotion
indefinitely even though he or she a quite clearly proved
31
